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Abstract
Friend-to-friend (F2F) overlays, which restrict direct communication
to mutually trusted parties, are a promising substrate for privacy-preserving
communication due to their inherent membership-concealment and Sybil-
resistance. Yet, existing F2F overlays suffer from a low performance,
are vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, or fail to provide anonymity.
In particular, greedy embeddings allow highly efficient communication in
arbitrary connectivity-restricted overlays but require communicating par-
ties to reveal their identity. In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving
routing scheme for greedy embeddings based on anonymous return ad-
dresses rather than identifying node coordinates. We prove that the pre-
sented algorithm are highly scalalbe, with regard to the complexity of
both the routing and the stabilization protocols. Furthermore, we show
that the return addresses provide plausible deniability for both sender
and receiver. We further enhance the routing’s resilience by using mul-
tiple embeddings and propose a method for efficient content addressing.
Our simulation study on real-world data indicates that our approach is
highly efficient and effectively mitigates failures as well as powerful denial-
of-service attacks.
1 Introduction
Anonymous and censorship-resistant communication is essential for providing
freedom of speech. In the last years, threats to this essential human right
have emerged in western countries as well, mainly in the form of self-censorship
caused by the fear of seemingly private communication being recorded 1. Due to
the natural vulnerability of publicly known servers to sabotage and corruption,
completely distributed solutions for anonymous communication and content dis-
tribution are required. However, the openness of distributed systems presents
a vulnerability, enabling attackers to infiltrate the system with a large number
of forged participants, as can seen e.g., from attacks on the Tor [1] network in
1
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F2F overlays circumvent the problem of connecting to permanently changing
strangers by restricting connectivity to participants sharing a mutual real-world
trust relationship. Hence, adversaries need to resort to social engineering attacks
for infiltration of the network. However, large-scale privacy-preserving commu-
nication in F2F overlays requires additional measures to achieve anonymity,
failure and attack resilience, and efficiency. Multiple studies have shown that
deployed F2F overlays such as Freenet [2] are highly inefficient and vulnerable
to attacks [3,4]. Virtual overlays have been proposed as an efficient alternative
[3,5], but recent work has shown that they inherently require unacceptable high
stabilization costs [6].
A potential solution is presented by greedy network embeddings such as
[7, 8]. Greedy embeddings allow for highly efficient greedy routing in arbitrary
connectivity-restricted overlays. For this purpose, they first construct a span-
ning tree of the network and then assign coordinates based on a node’s position
in the spanning tree. However, a participant can only contact a non-trusted con-
tact when knowing its coordinate in the network. Though only direct neighbors
can directly map the embedding coordinate to a real-world identity, arbitrary
participants can reconstruct the social graph based on the revealed coordinates.
Participants can then easily be identified from the social graph structure [9] and
correlated with their activities in the network due to the coordinate acting as
a persistent pseudonym. In this manner, governmental and commercial institu-
tions as well as curious strangers can track individual or all users and establish
detailed profiles of their behavior. Possibly even their opinions and interests,
published unencrypted in a supposedly anonymous manner, are revealed to the
adversary. Thus, network embeddings in their unaltered form fail to provide
receiver anonymity.
For utilizing the high efficiency of network embedding, our first requirement
is a modified addressing and routing protocol that provides both efficiency and
(receiver) anonymity. Second, due to the fragility of spanning trees in the pres-
ence of network dynamics and attacks, the resilience of the embedding to both
failures and denial-of-service attacks needs to be drastically increased. Rather
than only dropping messages, we assume that the adversary first strategically
sabotages the embedding algorithm to maximize the impact of its censorship.
Third, efficient content storage and retrieval requires the existence of a suitable
content addressing scheme for network embeddings.
Our solution addresses the above problems by i) introducing anonymous
return addresses to provide receiver anonymity, ii) constructing multiple em-
beddings and using backtracking during routing to increase the resilience, and
iii) utilizing the network embedding to provide a routing protocol for a vir-
tual overlay, thus avoiding the enormous stabilization costs of previous virtual
overlays.
Our embedding algorithm assigns coordinates in the form of vectors of b-bit
strings, so that nodes in the same subtree of the spanning tree share the same
2
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prefix, similar to the PIE embedding [8]. Rather than revealing the coordinate,
the receiver then generates an anonymous return address by applying a hash
cascade to the elements of the coordinate vector salted with a random seed.
After publishing the return address and the seed, the receiver can be contacted
efficiently without revealing any information that is not required for routing.
Furthermore, a node can publish several anonymous return addresses by vary-
ing the seed, In this manner, it can construct distinct pseudonyms for distinct
contexts, e.g., one pseudonym for each forum discussion it participates in. The
revealed information can be further reduced by applying an additional layer of
encryption at the price of a reduced efficiency.
By routing in multiple embeddings, we aim to increase the probability of
finding a route despite the disruption of routes in some but not all embeddings.
We propose a purely local algorithm for the construction of multiple spanning
trees of highly different structures to provide largely node-independent routes.
In addition, backtracking and a modified distance are integrated into the routing
to further improve resilience and avoid congestion.
We evaluate our solution both by a formal security analysis and an exten-
sive simulation study. In the security analysis, we prove a receiver can never
be uniquely identified from a return address. Our simulation study indicates
that our scheme is highly efficient compared existing approaches in terms of the
number of messages required for routing. Furthermore, the resilience is greatly
improved. In fact, the routing terminates successfully in the vast majority of
cases despite the presence of node failures or powerful attackers, which manip-
ulate the embedding and routing as well as forge connections to honest nodes.
2 Related Work
Here, we describe the state-of-the-art with regard to routing and content dis-
covery in F2F overlays.
The common characteristics of all F2F overlays are i) the restriction of con-
nections to trusted parties, ii) hop-by-hop anonymization, i.e., the transfer of
messages via a path of trusted nodes that rewrite the source tag of the mes-
sage to point to themselves and apply probabilistic delays before forwarding a
message, iii) encryption of all communication. In the following, we present ex-
isting approaches, categorizing them according to their routing methodology in
unstructured overlays, virtual overlays, and network embeddings. Routing is ap-
plied to either discover nodes based on network coordinates or, more commonly,
content based on a content key or description.
Unstructured approaches utilize flooding, e.g. in Turtle [10], or probabilistic
forwarding e.g. in OneSwarm [11]. GnuNet attempts to combine random walks
with deterministic routing [12]. These overlays focus locating content rather
than individual nodes. Due to the replication of content, the content can indeed
be located, but efficient communication between two uniquely defined entities
is not possible.
Virtual overlays address the problem of establishing an overlay despite the
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restricted connectivity by replacing overlay links with tunnels of trusted nodes.
So, efficient tunnel discovery and maintenance is a main concern given the in-
herent network dynamics: Vasserman et al. [3] suggest flooding the network for
discovering adequate overlay neighbors, thus creating a large overhead. In con-
trast, X-Vine leverages the overlay routing by concatenating previously existing
tunnels to a new one, thus entailing a increase of the average tunnel length and
hence routing costs over time [5]. Indeed, without an additional routing pro-
tocol in the underlying F2F overlay, efficient maintenance and efficient routing
are inherently mutually exclusive in a virtual overlay [6].
In contrast, network embeddings assign coordinates that allow efficient rout-
ing to nodes. For example, the F2F mode of Freenet relies on a network embed-
ding. However, results indicate that the embedding is lacking both with regard
to routing efficiency [3] and attack resilience [4]. Hoefer et al. [13] propose
highly efficient greedy embeddings. However, their approach reveals the identity
of the communicating parties and fails to consider resilience. Furthermore, their
proposed scheme for content addressing maps the majority of content keys to
the same central node.
In summary, network embeddings are the only existing approach providing
a high efficiency at acceptable maintenance costs. However, achieving receiver
anonymity,resilience, and suitably content addressing is an unsolved highly chal-
lenging problem.
3 Adversary Model
We aim to realize efficient F2F overlays making use of network embeddings but
at the same time providing receiver anonymity, resilience, and content address-
ing. Note that we do not consider sender anonymity because the problem of
sender anonymity can easily be solved by starting the routing with a short ran-
dom walk, as extensively analyzed for various anonymous look-up strategies for
distributed hash tables (DHTs) (e.g., [12, 14]). In contrast, receiver anonymity
is a challenging problem for network embeddings, because the coordinates act-
ing as a node’s pseudonym are essential for the routing process and hence for
the efficient communication between arbitrary node pairs. The term resilience
is loosely defined. In general, a system is denoted resilience if an action is only
slightly impaired by node failures or attacks. Commonly, a system is judged to
be resilient by comparison with others.
We consider two attack goals in our adversary model. The first goal is to
discover the identity of communicating parties, in particular the identity of the
designated receiver of a message. A second goal of the attacker is to block
undesired communication using a so-called black hole attack [15], which could
be applied in case an attacker fails to identify specific parties. During such an
attack, an adversary indiscriminately censors communication by first gaining a
predominant position in the system and then dropping all received messages.
In addition, attacks on the availability, such as pollution, i.e., denial-of-service
attacks by flooding the network with content and traffic, and eclipse attacks, i.e.,
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censoring of specific content, present a thread for any P2P systems. However,
these attacks have been addressed in various publications (e.g., [15]), which
can be applied to our contribution with few modifications. Hence, we do not
consider them in our evaluation.
As for the attacker’s capacities, we assume a local, active, internal, possibly
colluding attacker, able to drop and manipulate messages it receives. The ad-
versary can control one or several colluding nodes in the network but is unable
to observe the complete topology. In particular, we assume that an adversary
cannot be certain that it knows all neighbors of a node, in other words, the
complete circle of a user.We assume that this is hard, because it requires the
adversary to i) be sure that he knows all contacts from different social circles
of a user, such as family, close friends, and colleagues, and ii) establish connec-
tions to all of them. A global passive attacker is disregarded on the basis that
steganographic techniques can be applied to hide the F2F traffic as suggested
in e.g. [16]. However, attackers are modeled as polynomial time adversaries,
which are given a transcript of all own and public input, as well as all locally
observed traffic. Their computation power is therefore bounded by polynomial
time algorithms, which prevents breaking computationally-secure cryptographic
primitives. We assume that an adversary can easily forge an arbitrary number
of nodes, so called Sybils. However, gaining connections and hence influence
in a F2F overlay requires establishing real-world trust relationships. Such so-
cial engineering attacks are considered to be costly and difficult because they
require long-term interaction between a human adversary and an honest par-
ticipant. Thus, the number of connections between honest nodes and forged
participants can be assumed to be small, More precisely, we assume that the
number is logarithm with the network size, in agreement to previous work [5].
4 Network Embeddings
Our solution builds upon previous work in the area of network embeddings,
which assign coordinates to nodes with the goal of structuring networks, e.g.,
for efficient routing in wireless sensor networks or as an alternative to the cur-
rent IP layer in content-centric networking. We first introduce some notation,
then explain the principal concepts of network embeddings, and conclude by
describing specific algorithms. In particular, we detail the PIE embedding [8],
which we modify in Section 5 to allow for anonymity.
4.1 Basic Terminology
In the remainder of the paper, we represent an overlay network by a graph G =
(V,E) with nodes V and links or edges E ⊂ V ×V . Because we require mutual
trust for connection establishment in F2F overlays, the network is bidirectional.
We denote the neighbors of u by NGu = {v ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}. Therefore, a
Friend-to-friend (F2F) overlay is an overlay such that the set of links is given
by pairs of nodes sharing a real-world trust relationship. Embedding algorithms
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heavily rely on spanning trees, connected subgraphs ST = (V,ET ) of G such
that |ET | = |V | − 1. In such a (spanning) tree, one node r is designated as the
root and the position of nodes are described based on their relation to the root.
In particular, the level or depth of a node u is given by the length of the path
from u to r. If u is not the root, the parent of u is defined to be a neighbor
v ∈ NSTu with a shorter path to r than u, whereas the remaining neighbors
are u’s children. A node without children is called a leaf, whereas nodes with
children are called internal nodes.
4.2 Concept
Now, we define the concept of network embeddings and in particular greedy
network embeddings. In the following, let G = (V,E) be a network and (X, δX)
be a metric space with a distance δX . A network embedding is defined as a
function id : V → X assigning each node a coordinate. The problem of enabling
routing in a connectivity-restricted network has been addressed by the design
of greedy embeddings. Greedy embeddings [17] are coordinate assignments, such
that for any source-destination pair (s, t) ∈ V × V with s 6= t, a neighbor u of
s exists such that δX(u, t) < δX(s, t). We say that u is closer to t than s with
regard to δX . As a consequence, straight-forward greedy routing is guaranteed
to find a route from s to t.
Though there exists a multitude of greedy embedding algorithms, they all
follow the same four abstract steps: i) Construct a spanning tree T , ii) Each
internal node in T enumerates its children, iii) The root receives a predefined
coordinate, iv) Children derive their coordinate from the parent’s coordinate
and the enumeration index assigned by the parent (e.g. [7, 8, 18, 19]). The
coordinates are then distributed such that the embedding of the spanning tree is
greedy, as specified for the PIE embedding below. Subsequent to the coordinate
assignment, nodes consider all neighbors, including those that are neither parent
nor child, for the routing. So, routing is not restricted to tree edges. We call
non-tree edges shortcuts because they allow for a faster reduction of the distance
and shorter routes than predicted by the distance in the tree.
In the following, we consider the construction and stabilization costs for such
greedy embeddings. A spanning tree is constructed by i) selecting a root node
using a distributed leader election protocol such as [20, 21], and ii) building
the tree from the root. In this manner, it is possible to construct a spanning
tree with O(n log n) messages for a graph of diameter O(log n) [20], though
integrating protections against nodes aiming to cheat the root selection protocol
such as [21] require a higher cost. Various embeddings [8,18,19] are able to react
to dynamics without computing the complete embedding whenever the topology
changes. New nodes join the trees as leaves, requiring only a constant overhead
for contacting one of their neighbors to be their parent and receiving a coordinate
from said parent. If any node but the root leaves, only its descendants have to
reconnect. We show that the stabilization overhead then scales linearly with
the tree depth rather than linear with the number of participants.
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4.3 Existing Approaches
Though embedding algorithms generally rely on a spanning tree and assign co-
ordinates according to the tree structure, the nature of the assigned coordinates
is highly diverse: Embeddings into hyperbolic space such as [7,18,19] allow em-
bedding in low-dimensional spaces. However, proposed hyperbolic embeddings
are extremely complex and do not scale with regard to the number of bits re-
quired for coordinate representation [19]. Custom-metric approaches have been
designed to overcome these shortcomings. The custom-metric embedding PIE
[8] assigns an empty vector as the root coordinate. Child coordinates are then
derived from the parent coordinate by concatenating the parent coordinate with
the index assigned to the child by the parent, potentially weighted with the cost
of the parent-child edge if such weights are given. In this manner, a node s’s
coordinate represents the route from the root to u. Consequently, the distance
δX is given by the hop distance of two nodes in the tree. An example for the
PIE embedding in unweighted graphs is displayed on the left side of Figure 1.
Whereas routing in greedy embeddings is highly efficient in comparison to non-
greedy embeddings [13], neither anonymity nor resilience has been considered
in suitably manner.
5 Design
Our main contribution lies in proposing multiple greedy embeddings with anony-
mous return addresses and a virtual overlay on top of the embeddings. In the
following, we present our system, in particular
• a spanning tree construction and stabilization algorithm for multiple par-
allel embeddings,
• an embedding algorithm providing efficiency as well as allowing for im-
proved censorship-resistance through a modified distance,
• an address generation algorithm AdGennode enabling receiver anonymity,
and
• a virtual overlay design based on embeddings which allowing balanced
content distribution and efficient content retrieval.
5.1 Tree Construction and Stabilization
In this section, we show how we construct and stabilize γ parallel spanning trees.
In the next section, we then describe how to assign coordinates on the basis of
these trees. We want to increase the robustness and censorship-resistance by us-
ing multiple trees. In order to ensure that the trees indeed offer different routes,
our algorithm encourages nodes to select different parents in each tree if possi-
ble. Our algorithm design follows similar principles as the provable optimally
robust and resilient tree construction algorithm for P2P-based video streaming
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presented in [22]. However, the algorithm assumes that nodes can change their
neighbors. Thus, we cannot directly apply the algorithm nor the results. In the
following, we first discuss the tree construction and then the stabilization.
Tree Construction: We divide the construction of a tree into two phases
i) selecting the root, and ii) building the tree starting from the root. We can
apply [20] for the root election, which achieves a communication complexity of
O (n log n). Our own contribution lies in ii) the tree construction after the root
node has been chosen.
We now shortly describe the idea of our algorithm and then the actual algo-
rithm. A node u that is not the root receives messages from its neighbors when
they join a tree and are hence available as parent nodes. There are two ques-
tions to consider when designing an algorithm governing u’s reaction to such
messages, called invitations in the following. First, u has to decide if and when
it accepts an invitation. Second, u has to select an invitation in the presence of
multiple invitations.
For the second question, u always prefers invitation from nodes that have
been their parent in less trees with the goal of constructing different trees and
increasing the overall number of possible routes. Increasing the number of routes
allows the use of alternative routes if the request can not be routed along the
preferred route due to a failed or malicious node. If two neighbors are parents in
the same number of trees, u can either select one randomly or prefer the parent
closer to the root. Choosing a random parent reduces the impact of nodes close
to the root but is likely to lead to longer routes and thus a lower efficiency.
Coming back to the first question of if and when u accepts invitations, u
should always accept an invitation of a neighbor v that is not yet a parent of u
in any tree in order choose different parents as often as possible. In contrast,
if v is already a parent, u might wait for the invitation of a different neighbor.
However, it is unclear if it is possible for all neighbors of u to ever become a
parent. For example, a neighbor of degree 1 is only a parent if it is the root.
In order to overcome this dilemma, u periodically probabilistically decides if
it should accept v’s invitation or wait for another invitation. So, u eventually
accepts an invitation but does provide alternative parents the chance to send
an invitation.
Now, we describe the exact steps of the algorithm. The algorithm is a round-
based invitation protocol for the tree construction. After a node u is included
in the i-th tree, u sends invitations (i, u) to all its neighbors inviting them to
be its children in tree i. When u receives an information (j, w) for the j-th
tree from a neighbor w, it saves the invitation if it is not yet contained in tree
j and otherwise stores it. The invitation can still be used if u has to modify
its parent selection later. In each round, a node u considers all invitations for
trees it is not yet part of, as described in Algorithm 1. Let pc(v) be number
of trees for which a neighboring node v is a parent of u. If u has received
invitations from neighbors v with minimal pc(v) among all neighbors, u accepts
one of those invitations (Lines 1-3). In the presence of multiple invitations,
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we experiment with two selection strategies: i) Choosing a random invitation,
and ii) Choosing a random invitation from a node on the lowest level. The
latter selection scheme requires that the invitations also detail the level of the
potential parent node in the tree. If u does not have an invitation from any
node with minimal pc(v), u nevertheless accepts an invitation with probability
q in order to guarantee the termination of the tree construction. If u accepts a
parent, it selects a node v that has offered an invitation and has the lowest pc(v)
among neighbors with outstanding invitations (Lines 7-8). In this manner, we
guarantee the convergence of tree construction.
The acceptance probability q is essential for the diversity and the structure
of the trees: For a high q, nodes quickly accept invitations leading to trees of a
low depth and thus short routes. However, in the presence of an attacker acting
as the root of all or most trees, the trees are probably close to identical, result-
ing in a low censorship-resistance. A lower acceptance probability q increases
the diversity but entails longer routes. Thus, a low q results in a higher com-
munication complexity and at some point decreases the robustness due to the
increased likelihood of encountering failed nodes on a longer route. In Section
6.1, we show that the constructed trees are of a logarithmic depth such that we
indeed maintain a routing complexity of O(log n). Note that Algorithm 1 does
not assume that all trees are constructed at the same time. Rather, individual
trees can be (re-)constructed while the remaining trees impact the parent choice
in the new tree but remain unchanged.
Algorithm 1 constructTreeRound()
{Internal state: Set I of invitations, acceptance probability q, pc : Nu →
N0 number of times neighbor is parent}
1: PP ← {(i, w) ∈ I : ∀v ∈ Nu : pc(w) ≤ pc(v)}
2: if PP is not empty then
3: Select invitation in PP to answer
4: else
5: r ← uniform random number
6: if r ≤ q then
7: PQ← {inv = (i, w) ∈ I : ∀(j,v) ∈ I : pc(w) ≤ pc(v)}
8: Select invitation in PQ to answer
9: end if
10: end if
Stabilization: Now, we consider the stabilization of the trees when nodes join
and leave. Stabilizing the trees efficiently, i.e., repairing them locally rather than
reconstructing the complete tree whenever the topology changes, is essential for
efficiency. Joining nodes can be integrated in a straight-forward manner by con-
necting to their neighbors as children, again trying to maximize the diversity
of the parents. For this purpose, nodes record the time, i.e., the round in our
abstract time model, they joined the tree. Now, when a new node u joins, it
9
Figure 1: Original PIE and modified PIE coordinates using b = 6-bit number
requests its neighbors’ coordinates and these timestamps for all trees. Based on
this information, u can simulate Algorithm 1 locally, ensuring that its expected
depth in the tree is unaffected by its delayed join. When a node departs, all its
children have to choose a different parent and inform their descendants of the
change. In order to prevent a complete subtree from being relocated at an in-
creased depth, the descendants may also select a different parent. The selection
of the new parent again follows Algorithm 1 but only locally re-establishes the
trees affected by the node departure. We show that the stabilization complexity
considering any node but the root is linear in the terms of average depth of the
node in the trees in Section 6.1.
We formally prove that the above stabilization algorithm indeed only in-
troduces only logarithmic complexity in Section 6.1. We now present the em-
bedding algorithm, which in agreement with the presented tree construction
algorithm, assigns coordinates within subtrees independently of the remaining
subtrees to allow for local stabilization.
5.2 Embedding and Routing
In this section, we show how we assign coordinates in a spanning tree and how to
route based on these coordinates. As we want to prevent an attacker from guess-
ing the coordinate of a receiver, we require a certain degree of in-determinism in
the coordinate assignment. We thus choose a slightly modified version of the un-
weighted PIE embedding [8], which we have introduced in Section 4. Our main
modification lies the use of in-deterministic coordinates in order to prevent an
adversary from guessing the coordinate and thus undermining the anonymiza-
tion schemes presented in the next section. The routing algorithm corresponds
to the greedy routing with backtracking. In addition to the tree distance in [8],
we also present a second distance preferring nodes with a long common prefix
and thus avoiding routes via nodes close to the root whenever possible. In this
manner, we increase robustness and censorship-resistance because the routing
algorithm considers alternative routes and the impact of strategically choos-
ing a position close to the root is reduced. In the following, we subsequently
present the embedding algorithm, the distance functions, and the routing with
backtracking.
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Embedding Algorithm: Embeddings are performed on each of the γ trees
independently, so that we only consider one embedding id . Throughout this
section, let b be a sufficiently large integer, PRNG a pseudo-random number
generator with values in Zb2, and h : {0, 1}∗ → H a cryptographically secure
hash function. We describe the embedding algorithm, then the distance used
for routing, and last, the backtracking procedure, which allows highly resilient
routing despite failures.
We now describe the embedding algorithm for one tree. The coordinate
assignment starts at the root and then spreads successively throughout the tree.
After a spanning tree has been established, the root r is assigned an empty vector
as a coordinate id(r) = (). In the next step, each child v of the root generates a
random b-bit number a ∈ Zb2 such that its coordinate is id(v) = (a). Here, our
algorithm differs from the PIE embedding because it uses random rather than
consecutive numbers, thus preventing an adversary from guessing the coordinate
in an efficient manner. Subsequently, nodes in the tree are assigned coordinates
by concatenating their parent’s coordinate with a random number. So, upon
receiving its parent coordinate id(p(v)) = (a1, . . . , al−1), a node v on level l of
the tree obtains its coordinate id(v) = (a1, . . . , al−1, al) by adding a random
b-bit number al. The coordinate space is hence given by all vectors consisting
of b-bit numbers, i.e., X = {(a1, . . . , al−1, al) : l ∈ N0, ai ∈ {0, 1}b}. Figure 1
displays the differences between the original PIE embedding and our variation.
Note that the independent random choice of the b-bit number a ∈ Zb2 might
lead to two nodes having the same coordinate. Thus, b should be chosen such
that the chance of equal coordinates should be negligible. If two children never-
theless select the same coordinate, the parent node should inform one of them
to adapt its choice. Note that allowing the parent to influence the coordinate
selection in this manner does not really increase the vulnerability to attacks,
as the parent can achieve at least the same damage by constantly changing its
coordinate. Such constant changes can be detected easily, so that nodes should
stop selecting such nodes as parents. In general, by moving the choice of the last
coordinate element from the parent to the child, we automatically reduce the
impact of a malicious parent as it can not determine the complete coordinate
of the child.
Distances: We still need to define distances between coordinates in order to
apply greedy routing. For this purpose, we consider two distances on X. Both
rely on the common prefix length cpl(x1, x2) of two vectors x1 and x2 and the
coordinate length |x1|.
First, we consider the tree distance δTD from [8], which gives the length of
path between the two nodes in the tree, i.e.,
δTD(x1, x2) = |x1|+ |x2| − 2cpl(x1, x2). (1)
Secondly, the common prefix length can be used as the determining factor
in the distance function, i.e., for a constant L exceeding the length of all node
11
Figure 2: Tree distance (TD) δTD and common prefix length based distance
δCPL when routing from node s to e: δCPL prefers nodes in the same subtree
as the destination, leading to better censorship-resistance at the price of longer
routes. The table gives the distances in the first hop for s and its neighbors r
and u.
coordinates in the overlay, we define
δCPL(x1, x2) =
{
L− cpl(x1, x2)− 1|x1|+|x2|+1 , x1 6= x2
0, x1 = x2
. (2)
The reason for using the common prefix length rather than the actual tree
distance is the latter’s preference of routes passing nodes close to the root in
the tree. In this manner, these nodes on these routes are very influential, so that
adversaries can gain a large impact from gaining such a position. In contrast,
δCPL prefers possibly longer routes by always forwarding to a node within the
same subtree as the destination and avoids central nodes in the tree. An example
of the difference between the two distances and the impact on the discovered
routes is displayed in Figure 2.
Greedy Routing in Multiple Embeddings: We route in 1 ≤ τ ≤ γ trees
in parallel. More precisely, given a vector of coordinates (id1(e), . . . , idγ(e)), the
sender s selects τ coordinates and sends a request for each of them. s can either
select τ embeddings uniformly at random or choose the embeddings so that
the distance of the neighbor vi with the closest coordinate to id i(e) is minimal.
The latter choice might result in shorter routes due to the low distance in the
embedding.
The routing processes in each embedding independently. Nodes forward the
request to the neighbor with the closest coordinate in the respective embedding.
Thus, in order for the nodes on the route to forward the request correctly,
the request has to contain both the coordinate id i(v) and the index i of the
embedding. In practice, we can achieve a performance gain by including multiple
coordinates and embedding indices in one message if the next hop in two or more
embeddings are identical. For now, we assume that one message is sent for each
embedding for simplicity.
We optionally increase the robustness and censorship-resistance of the rout-
ing algorithm by allowing backtracking if the routing gets stuck in a local mini-
mum of the distance function due to failures or intentional refusal to forward a
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request. For this purpose, all nodes remember their predecessor on the routing
path as well as the neighbors they have forwarded the request to. If all neigh-
bors closer to the target have been considered and have been unable to deliver
the request, the node reroutes the request to its predecessor for finding an al-
ternative path. The routing is thus only considered to be failed if the request
returns to its source s and cannot be forwarded to any other neighbor. In this
manner, all greedy paths, i.e., all paths with a monotonously decreasing distance
to the target, are found.
Algorithm 2 route()
{Input: current node u, message msg from node w, tree index i, target
coordinate xi}
{Internal state: set S(msg) of nodes u forwarded mess to, predecessor
pred(msg), distance δ}
1: if idi(u) == xi then
2: Routing succeeds
3: else
{Store predecessor unless backtracking}
4: if not S(msg) contains w then
5: pred(msg)← w
6: end if
{Determine closest neighbors}
7: C ← argminv∈Nu\S(msg)δ(idi(v), xi)
8: next← random element in C
9: if δ(idi(v), xi) > δ(idi(next), xi) then
10: Forward msg to next {Forward if improvement}
11: else
12: if pred(msg) is set then
13: Forward msg to pred(msg) {Backtrack}
14: else
15: Routing failed
16: end if
17: end if
18: end if
Algorithm 2 gives the pseudo code describing one step of the routing algo-
rithm, including the backtracking procedure. When receiving a message msg,
the node u first checks if it is the receiver of msg, thus successfully terminating
the routing (Line 2). If u is not the receiver, it determines if the routing is
currently in the backtracking phase by checking if u has previously forwarded
msg to the sender w. Otherwise, it stores the sender of msg as a predecessor
for potential later backtracking (Line 5). In the manner of greedy routing, u
selects the closest neighbor to the target coordinate. In the presence of several
closest neighbors, u picks one of them uniformly at random (Lines 7-8). Note
that in the presence of failures, the embedding can lose its greediness. Hence,
to avoid loops, u only forwards the request to that neighbor if it is indeed closer
(Line 10). Otherwise, u contacts its predecessor (Line 13) or forfeits the routing
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if no such predecessor exists (Line 15), i.e., if u is the source of the request.
This completes the description of the routing and stabilization functionali-
ties. However, up to now, we used identifying coordinates rather than anony-
mous addresses.
5.3 Anonymous Return Addresses
In this section, we introduce our address generation algorithm for generating
anonymous return addresses but do not reveal the receiver of the request. For
this reason, we call the generated addresses route preserving (RP) return ad-
dresses. Based on these return addresses, we specify two routing algorithms
RTD and RCPL for routing a request containing a return address. The return
addresses allow a node to determine the common prefix length of their neighbor’s
coordinates and the receiver coordinate, which allows the node to determine the
closest neighbor. Hence, RTD and RCPL correspond to Algorithm 2 for the two
distance function δTD and δCPL when using return addresses rather than a re-
ceiver coordinates. After describing the algorithm, we show that the return
addresses indeed preserve routes.
Return Address Generation: Return addresses are generated in three steps:
1. Padding the coordinate
2. Applying a hash cascade to obtain the return address
3. Adding a MAC
Algorithm 3 displays the pseudo code of the above steps.
Algorithm 3 generateRP()
{Input: coordinate x = (a1, . . . , al), seed s, spad}
{Internal State: key KMAC(v), h, PRNG}
1: k˜ ← PRNG(s)
2: d1 ← h(k˜ ⊕ a1)
3: for j = 2 . . . L do
4: if j ≤ l then
5: a′j ← aj
6: else
7: a′j ← PNRG(spad + j) {Padding}
8: end if
9: dj ← h(dj−1 ⊕ a′j) {Hash cascade}
10: end for
11: mac← h(KMAC(v)||d1||d2|| . . . ||dL) {MAC}
12: Publish y = (d1, . . . , dL), k˜,mac
The first step of the return address generation prevents an adversary from
identifying coordinates based on their length. A node v pads its coordinate
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x = (a1, . . . , al) by adding random elements a
′
l+1, . . . , a
′
L. More precisely, v
selects a seed spad for the pseudo-random number generator PRNG and obtains
the padded coordinate x′ = (a′1, . . . , a
′
l, a
′
l+1, . . . , a
′
L) with
a′j =
{
aj , j ≤ l
PRNG(spad ⊕ j), j > l
.
In order to ensure that the closest node coordinate to x′ is indeed x, v recom-
putes the padding with a different seed if a′l+1 is equal to the l + 1-th element
of a child’s coordinate 3. Afterwards, v chooses a different seed s for the con-
struction of the actual return address and generates k˜ = PRNG(s) ∈ K˜ = Zb2.
v then executes the local function hc : X→ Y = HL in order to obtain a vector
y with elements in H. The i-th element of y = (d1, . . . , dL) is given by
dj =
{
h(k˜ ⊕ a′1), j = 1
h(dj−1 ⊕ a′j), j = 2 . . . L
. (3)
We call the pair (y, k˜) a return address, which can be used to find a route to
the node with coordinate x. Before publishing the return address, v adds a
MAC mac(yi,KMAC(v)) = h(d1|| . . . dL||KMAC(v)) for a private key KMAC(v)
to prevent malicious nodes from faking return addresses and gaining information
from potential replies. Last, v publishes the return address (y, k˜) and the MAC.
Routing Algorithms: Now, we determine diversity measures δRP−TD : X×
Y → R+ and δRP−CPL : X×Y → R+ in order to compare coordinates x and
y with regard to δTD and δCPL. The diversity measure then assumes the role
of the distance δ in Algorithm 2. 4
In order to define a sensible diversity measure, note that for any coordinate
c and return address y for coordinate x, we have cpl(x, c) = cpl(y, hc(c, k˜)).
We thus can define the diversity measure in terms of the common prefix length
in the same manner as the distance. More precisely, for ∗ ∈ {TD,CPL}, the
diversity δRP−∗(y, k˜, c) for of a coordinate c to the return address y is
δRP−∗(y, k˜, c) = δ∗(yi, hc(c, k˜)). (4)
In practice, u can increase the efficiency of the computation by only determining
hc(c, k˜) up to the first element in which it disagrees with y. Thus, we now
have two possible realizations of the routing algorithm Rnode, namely R
TD
and RCPL. Given the RP return address (y, k˜) of the destination e, RTD and
RCPL forward the message to the neighbor v with the lowest diversity measure
δRP−TD(y, k˜, id(v)) and δRP−CPL(y, k˜, id(v)), respectively.
3We exclude this step in Algorithm 3 for increased readability
4Note that a diversity measure is not a distance because it i) is defined for two potentially
distinct sets X and Y, and ii) is not symmetric.
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Proving Route Preservation: We now prove formally that the above re-
turn addresses preserve routes. For this purpose, we first define the notion of
preserving a property of a coordinates. Note that we
Definition 5.1. Let Qu : P(X) ×X → P(X) be a local function of node u in
a graph G = (V,E) Given a set C ⊂ XV = {v ∈ V : id(v)} of node coordinates
and a target coordinate x ∈ X, Qu returns a subset C ′ ⊂ C. A return address
(y, k˜) for a coordinate x is said to preserve Q if for all u ∈ V , there exists a
function Q′u : P(X)×Y × K˜→ P(X) such that for all C ⊂ X
Q′u(C, y, k˜) = Qu(C, x).
The notion of route preserving (RP) return addresses now follows if we
choose the function Qu to return the neighbors with the closest coordinates
to cord(y, k˜).
Definition 5.2. Let
rau : P(X)×X→ P(X),
rau(C, x) = argminc∈C{δ(c, x)}
(5)
determine the closest coordinates in a set C to a coordinate x. A return address
(y, k˜) is called route preserving (RP) (with regard to δ) if it preserves ra.
Based Definition 5.2, we can now show that Algorithm 3 generates RP return
addresses.
Theorem 5.3. Algorithm 3 generates RP return addresses with regard to the
distances δTD and δCPL.
Proof. In order to show that (y, k˜) preserves routes, we derive the relation be-
tween the diversity measures δRP−TD and δRP−CPL, defined in Eq. 4, and the
corresponding distances δTD and δCPL, defined in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2, respectively.
Let cord(y, k˜) denote the padded coordinate used to generate y, and let x
be the coordinate without padding. In the following, we relate the distance of
x and a coordinate c to the diversity measure of (y, k˜) and c. We can assume
that cpl(cord(y, k˜), c) = cpl(x, c) ≤ |x|, i.e., the common prefix length of the
padded coordinate and c is at most equal to the length of the original coordi-
nate x. A node with coordinate c with cpl(cord(y, k˜), c) > |x| cannot exist in a
valid embedding. More precisely, our embeddings algorithm ensures that coor-
dinates are unique and a node v ensures that the first element of the padding
does not corresponds to the |id(v)|+ 1-th element of a descendant’s coordinate.
Thus, the coordinate x is the unique closest coordinate of a node to the padded
coordinate. Thus, we can indeed limit our evaluation to coordinates c with
cpl(cord(y, k˜), c) ≤ |x|.
We start by considering the tree distance δTD. By Eq. 4, we have
δRP−TD(y, k˜, c) = L+ |c| − 2cpl(cord(y, k˜), c)
= |x|+ |c| − 2cpl(x, c) + (L− |x|)
= δTD(x, c) + (L− |x|).
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Hence, diversity measure and distance only differ by a constant independent of
c. Thus, any forwarding node can determine the closest coordinates to the desti-
nation in its neighborhood and thus Algorithm 3 generates RP return addresses
with regard to δTD.
For the distance δCPL, we consider two coordinates c1 and c2 with cpl(cord(y, k˜), ci) =
cpl(x, ci) for i = 1, 2. We show that i) δCPL(x, c1) = δCPL(x, c2) iff δRP−CPL(y, k˜, c1) =
δRP−CPL(y, k˜, c2) and ii) δCPL(x, c1) < δCPL(x, c2) iff δRP−CPL(y, k˜, c1) <
δRP−CPL(y, k˜, c2) . Thus, the return address (y, k˜) is RP as the comparison
of two coordinates yields the same order when using the return address as for
the original coordinate. For i) note that by Eq. 2 δCPL(x, c1) = δCPL(x, c2)
implies that cpl(x, c1) = cpl(x, c2) and |c1| = |c2|. Because cpl(cord(y, k˜), ci) =
cpl(x, ci), we have δRP−CPL(y, k˜, c1) = δRP−CPL(y, k˜, c2). The converse holds
analogously by Eq. 4. If ii) δCPL(x, c1) < δCPL(x, c2), then Eq. 2 implies
that either cpl(x, c1) > cpl(x, c2) or cpl(x, c1) = cpl(x, c2) and |c1| < |c2|. In
the first case, the claim follows as cpl(cord(y, k˜), ci) = cpl(x, ci) and δCPL and
δRP−CPL both prefer coordinates with a longer common prefix length. For the
second case, the claim follows under the assumptions cpl(x, c1) = cpl(x, c2) and
cpl(cord(y, k˜), ci) = cpl(x, ci), because
δCPL(x, c1) < δCPL(x, c2)
⇐⇒ L− cpl(x, c1)− 1|x|+ |c1|+ 1 < L− cpl(x, c2)−
1
|x|+ |c2|+ 1
⇐⇒ − 1|x|+ |c1|+ 1 < −
1
|x|+ |c2|+ 1
⇐⇒ |x|+ |c1|+ 1 < |x|+ |c2|+ 1
⇐⇒ L+ |c1|+ 1 < L+ |c2|+ 1
⇐⇒ − 1
L+ |c1|+ 1 < −
1
L+ |c2|+ 1
⇐⇒ δCPL(cord(y, k˜), c1) < δCPL(cord(y, k˜), c2)
⇐⇒ δRP−CPL(y, k˜, c1) < δRP−CPL(y, k˜, c2)
Hence for both cases i) and ii), Algorithm 3 generates RP return addresses with
regard to δCPL.
Up to now, we have only considered route preserving return addresses gen-
erated by padding coordinates and applying a hash cascade. Optionally, an
additionally layer of symmetric encryption can be added, preventing a node v
from deriving the actual length of the common prefix. Rather, v can only deter-
mine if a neighbor is closer to the destination than v itself. However, we show
the same degree of anonymity for for both algorithms, so that the additional
layer does not result in a provably higher level of anonymity. Furthermore, the
additional layer reduces the efficiency as nodes select one closer neighbor at
random rather than the closest neighbor. For this reason, the advantage of the
additional layer is limited, so that we focus on RP return addresses here and
defer the further obfuscation of coordinates to the appendix.
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We prove that Algorithm 3 indeed enables receiver anonymity in Section 8.
5.4 Content Storage
In order to store content, we use a distributed hash table (DHT). As nodes
can not communicate directly, they store tree addresses in their routing tables
and leverage the tree routing. In this manner, we do not require maintenance-
intensive tunnels like [5] and [3]. Note that we only sketch the solution for
content storage and retrieval because our focus lies in improving the quality of
the greedy embeddings for messaging between nodes. In the following, we first
present the idea of our design and then a realization based upon a recursive
Kademlia.
General Design: Nodes establish a DHT by maintaining a routing table
of (virtual) overlay connections. The routing table contains entries correspond
to a DHT coordinate and corresponding return addresses. Nodes communicate
with their virtual neighbors by sending requests in any of the γ embedding.
New routing table entries are added by routing for a suitable virtual overlay
key, as done in [5] for the tunnel discovery. However, after the routing termi-
nates, the discovered nodes send back their return addresses rather than taking
the routing path as a new tunnel. In this manner, the length of routes be-
tween virtual overlay neighbors only depends on the trees and does not increase
over time. The exact nature of the neighbor discovery, the routing algorithm
Rcontent, and the stabilization of the virtual overlay depend on the specifications
of the DHT.
Kademlia: In our evaluation in Sections 6 and 7, we utilize a highly resilient
recursive Kademlia [23]. In Kademlia, a node selects a Kademlia identifier
ID(v) uniformly at random in the form of a 160-bit number. The distance
between identifiers is equal to their XOR. Nodes maintain many redundant
(virtual) overlay connections to increase the resilience. More precisely, each
node v keeps a routing table of k-buckets. The j-th bucket contains up to k
addresses of nodes u so that the common prefix length of ID(v) and ID(u)
is j. Maintaining more than 1 neighbor per common prefix length increases
the robustness to failures and possibly even to attacks due to the existence of
alternative connections.
Based on such routing tables, efficient and robust content discovery is pos-
sible. Files are indexed by keys corresponding to the hash of their content, i.e.,
the algorithm AdGencontent for the generation of file addresses is a hash func-
tion. A node u requesting a file with key f looks up the closest nodes v1, . . . , vα
to f in its routing table in terms of virtual overlay coordinates. Then, u routes
for each vi in the τ trees. Upon receiving one of the messages, vi returns f
via the same route if in possession of f . Otherwise, v forwards the message
to the overlay neighbor closest to f , again using tree routing, and returns an
acknowledgement message to u. If a node on the route has already received
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Figure 3: Layers of VOUTE: 1) F2F overlay as restricted topology, 2) Tree
embeddings T1 and T2 offer addressing for messaging, 3) Virtual overlays with
tree addresses offer content sharing DHT routing based on tree addresses
the message via a parallel query, it returns a backtrack message such that the
predecessor can contact a different node. Similarly, if a node does not receive
an acknowledgement from its overlay neighbor in time, it selects an alternative
node from its routing table if virtual neighbors closer to f than u exist.
Similarly, stabilization is realized in the same reactive manner as in the
original Kademlia. Whenever a node successfully sends a message to an overlay
neighbor, this neighbor returns an acknowledgement containing updated return
addresses if any coordinates were changed. If a node in the routing table cannot
be contacted, the node removes the neighbor from the routing table. Depending
on the implementation, it initializes a new neighbor discovery request for the
prefix. In addition, suitable neighbors encountered during routing are added to
the routing table.
We have now presented the essential components of our design. In the fol-
lowing, we evaluate our design with regard to our requirements. The different
layers of our system are displayed in Figure 3
6 Efficiency and Scalability
In this section, we analyze the efficiency of our scheme with regard to routing
complexity, stabilization complexity, and their evolution over time.
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6.1 Theoretical Analysis
In the first part of this section, we obtain upper bounds on the expected routing
length of the routing algorithms RTD and RCPL. The desired upper bound on
the routing complexity follows by multiplying this bound for routing in one tree
with τ , the number of trees used for parallel routing. Afterwards, we consider
the stabilization complexity CSS of the stabilization algorithm S consisting
of i) the local reconstruction of the trees according to Algorithm 1 and ii) the
assignment of new coordinates for the nodes affected by a change topology using
the modified PIE embedding.
Routing: We consider both messaging between nodes as well as content dis-
covery in the DHT.
Theorem 6.1. Let id be a modified PIE embedding on a spanning tree of G
generated by Algorithm 1 with parameters γ and q. Furthermore, assume that the
diameter of G is diam(G) = O(log n). The expected routing length of Algorithm
2 is at most
E(RTD) = O
(
γ
q
log n
)
(6)
for the routing algorithm RTD, and
E(RCPL) = O
((
γ
q
)2
log n
)
(7)
for RCPL.
For the proof, we first show Lemma 6.2, which bounds the expected level of
a node in trees constructed by Algorithm 1. More precisely, we prove that the
expected level of a node in any tree constructed by Algorithm 1 is increased by
at most a constant factor in comparison to a breath-first-search.
Lemma 6.2. Let T be any of the γ trees constructed by Algorithm 1 and r the
root of T . Furthermore, denote by spr(v) the length of the shortest path from v
to r, and let LT (v) be the level of v in T . Then the expected value of LT (v) is
bound by
E(LT (v)) ≤ spr(v) ·
(
1 +
γ
q
)
. (8)
Proof. We first give an upper bound on the expected number of rounds until a
node v accepts an invitation for T after receiving the first invitation. Afterwards,
we show Eq. 8 by induction.
In the first step, we denote the number of rounds until acceptance by Y . In
order to derive an upper bound on E(Y ), we assume that v does not receive any
invitation that it can immediately accept, i.e., an invitation from neighbors u
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with minimal parent count pc(u). Thus, v accepts one invitation with probabil-
ity q in each round. In the worst case, the γ-th accepted invitation is for tree T .
The number of rounds thus corresponds to the sum of γ identically distributed
geometrically distributed random variables X1, . . . , Xγ . Here, Xi is the num-
ber of trials until the first success of a sequence of Bernoulli experiments with
success probability q, i.e., the number of rounds until an invitation is accepted.
The random variable X = X1+ . . .+Xγ describes the number of trials until the
γ-th success and presents an upper bound on the expected number of rounds
until acceptance of an invitation for tree T . We hence derive an upper bound
on E(Y ) by
E(Y ) ≤ E(X) =
γ∑
i=1
E(Xi) = γE(X1) =
γ
q
. (9)
In the second step, we apply induction on l = spr(v). Note that the level of a
node in the tree is at most the number of rounds until an invitation is accepted
from the start of the protocol. For l = 1, the node v receives an invitation
from r at round 1 of the protocol because v is a neighbor of the root node. In
expectation, v joins T at round at most 1 + E(Y ) ≤ 1 + γq , which shows the
claim for l = 1. Now, we assume Eq. 8 holds for l − 1 and show that then it
also holds for l. The number of rounds Z until the node v at level l accepts
an invitation in tree T is the sum of Z1, the number of rounds until the first
invitation is received, and Z2 the number of rounds v accepts after receiving
the first invitation. v is the neighbor of a node w with spr(w) = l − 1 and
receives an invitation from w one round after w joined T . So, Z1 is bound by
our induction hypothesis, and Z2 is equal to Y and hence bound by Eq. 9. As
a result,
E(Z) = E(Z1) + 1 + E(Z2) ≤ (l − 1) ·
(
γ
q
+ 1
)
+ 1 +
γ
q
+ 1 = l ·
(
γ
q
+ 1
)
,
and hence indeed Eq. 8 holds.
Based on Lemma 6.2, we now prove Theorem 6.1. The idea of the proof is
to bound the routing length by a multiple of expected level of a node.
Proof. We consider the diversity measure δRP−TD first and then δRP−CPL.
For δRP−TD, the claim follows directly from Lemma 6.2 and Theorem 4.3 in
[8]. More precisely, the expected level of a node is at most O
(
γ
q log n
)
assuming
a diameter and hence maximal distance to the root of O(log n). Recall that the
distance δTD(id(s), id(e)) of two nodes s and e corresponds to the length of the
shortest path between them in the tree and is an upper bound on the routing.
Now, by Eq. 1, the sum of the length of the two coordinates is an upper bound
on δTD(id(s), id(e)). As the length of a coordinate is equal to the level of the
corresponding node in the tree, we indeed obtain
E(RTDs,e ) ≤ E(δTD(id(s), id(e))) ≤ E(LT (s)) + E(LT (e)) = O
(
γ
q
log n
)
. (10)
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The last step follows from Lemma 6.2. Eq. 6 follows because Eq. 10 holds for
all source-destination pairs (s, e).
In contrast, the proof for the common prefix length based similarities cannot
build on previous results. Note that the change of the distance function does not
affect the existence of a path with expected length at most E(LT (s))+E(LT (e))
between source s and destination e in the tree. However, the routing might
divert from that path when discovering a node with a longer common prefix
length but at a higher depth. For this reason, the sum of the expected levels
is not an upper bound on the routing length. Rather, whenever a node with
a longer common prefix length is contacted, the upper bound of the remaining
number of hops is reset to the expected level of that node in addition to the
level of e. In the following, we show that such a reset increases the distance
in tree by less than γq on average. The claim then follows because the number
of resets is bound by the expected level of the destination. Eq. 7 follows by
multiplication of the increased distance per reset and the number of resets.
More precisely, let Xi give the tree distance between the i-th contacted node
vi and the target e. Again, we cannot use the traditional approach for deriving
the routing length because Xi is not monotonously decreasing. Rather, we need
to bound the number of times Z1 that Xi increases and the expected amount of
increase Z2. Thus, the routing length R
CPL
s,e from a source node s to e is bound
by
E(RCPLs,e ) ≤ E(LT (s)) + E(LT (e)) + E(Z1)E(Z2). (11)
The number of times Z1 the common prefix length can increase is bound by the
length of the target’s coordinate and hence its level in T . So by Lemma 6.2,
E(Z1) ≤ E(LT (e)). (12)
The tree distance Xi is potentially increased whenever a node with a longer
common prefix length is contacted. Yet, an upper bound on the expected in-
crease is given by the difference in the levels LT (vi) and LT (vi+1) minus 1 due
to the increased common prefix length. Note that vi and vi+1 are neighbors and
hence the length of their shortest path to the root differs by at most 1. Lemma
6.2 thus provides the desired bound on E(Z2)
E(Z2) ≤ E (LT (vi)− LT (vi+1))− 1 = γ
q
. (13)
The desired bound can now be derived from Lemma 6.2, Eqs. 11, 12, and 13
under the assumption that the diameter of the graph and hence all shortest
paths to the root scale logarithmically, i.e.,
E(RCPLs,e ) ≤ E(LT (s)) + E(LT (e)) + E(LT (e))
γ
q
= O
((
γ
q
)2
log n
)
. (14)
As for the first part, Eq. 7 follows because Eq. 14 holds for all pairs (s, e).
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The bounds for a virtual overlay lookup based on routing algorithm Rcontent
follow directly from the fact that a DHT lookup requires O(log n) overlay hops
with each hop corresponding to one route in the network embedding.
Corollary 6.3. If the DHT used for the virtual overlay offers logarithmic rout-
ing, the communication complexity of routing algorithm Rcontent is
E(DHTTD) = O
(
γ
q
log2 n
)
for the diversity measure δRP−TD and
E(DHTCPL) = O
((
γ
q
)2
log2 n
)
for diversity measure δRP−CPL.
Stabilization: The stabilization complexity is required to stay polylog in the
network size to allow for scalable communication and content addressing. In the
following, we hence give bounds for the self-stabilization of the network embed-
dings, the costs for the virtual overlay follow by considering the maintenance
costs for DHT as suggested for general overlay networks and multiplying with
the length of the routes between overlay neighbors.
Theorem 6.4. We assume the social graph G to be of a logarithmic diameter
and a constant average degree. Furthermore, we assume the use of a the root
election protocol with complexity O(n log n). Then stabilization complexity CSS
of the spanning trees constructed by Algorithm 6.2 with parameters γ and q for
one topology change is
E(CSS) = O
(
γ
γ
q
log n
)
. (15)
Proof. We first consider the complexity for one tree. The general result then
follows by multiplying with the number of trees γ. When a node joins an overlay
with a constant average degree, the communication complexity of receiving and
replying to all invitations is constant. For a node departure, we consider non-
root nodes and root nodes separately. If a any node but the root departs, the
expected stabilization complexity corresponds to the number of nodes that have
to rejoin T . This number of nodes is equal to the number of descendants in a
tree. Hence, the expected complexity of a departure corresponds to the expected
number of descendants. Consider that a node on level l is a descendant of l
nodes, so that the expected number of descendants D is given by
E(D) =
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
E(LT (v)) = O
(
γ
q
log n
)
.
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If the root node leaves, the spanning tree and the embedding have to be re-
established at a complexity of O(n log n). As the probability for the root to
depart is 1/n, we indeed have
E(CSS) = O
(
γ
q
log n
)
+O
(
1
n
n log n
)
= O
(
γ
q
log n
)
.
We have shown that the complexity of routing, content discovery, and sta-
bilization is bound (poly-)log as required.
6.2 Simulations
In this section, we validate the above bounds and relate them to the concrete
communication overhead for selected scenarios. We start by detailing our sim-
ulation model and set-up, followed by our expectation, the results and their
interpretation.
Model and Evaluation Metrics: In order to evaluate the efficiency, we
consider the routing length and the stabilization complexity. We express the
stabilization costs in terms of the average number of coordinates that have to
reassigned when a randomly chosen node leaves, i.e., the average number of
descendants of a node. The number of messages required for the assigning the
new coordinates is at most two per assignment, namely the disconnected node
registering at a new parent and receiving a new coordinate. We conducted the
study to determine how the number of trees, the tree construction algorithm,
and the distance function affect routing and stabilization costs.
We compared our results to those for Freenet, a virtual overlay V O, and the
original PIE embedding. The virtual overlay V O combines the advantages of
X-Vine and MCON by using shortest paths as tunnels in a Kademlia overlay
like MCON but integrating backtracking in the presence of local optima and
shortcuts from one tunnel to another like X-Vine.
Set-up: Due to space constraints, we restrict the presented results to one
example network, namely the giant component of a community network from
Facebook with 63392 users 5.
The spanning tree construction in Algorithm 1 is parametrized by the num-
ber of trees γ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15}, the acceptance probability q = 0.5, and
the selection criterion W chosen to be either random selection (denoted DIV-
RAND) or preference of nodes at a low depth (denoted DIV-DEP). In addition,
we consider a breadth first search for spanning tree construction (denoted BFS ).
Moreover, we consider the impact of the two distances δTD (denoted TD) and
δCPL (denoted CPL). The length of the return addresses was set to L = 128
5http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/facebook-wosn-links
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and the number of bits per element was b = 128, all τ = γ embeddings were
considered for routing.
For the virtual overlay used for content addressing, we chose a highly resilient
recursive Kademlia [23] with bucket size 8 and α ∈ {1, 3} parallel look-ups. Be-
cause routing table entries are not uniquely determined by Kademlia identifiers,
the entries were chosen randomly from all suitable candidates.
We parametrized the related approaches as follows. For simulating Freenet,
we executed the embedding for 6, 000 iteration as suggested in [24] and then
routed using a distance-directed depth-first search based only on the informa-
tion about direct neighbors. The routing and stabilization complexity of the
original PIE embedding is equal to the respective quantities of our algorithm
for γ = 1, the distance function δTD and routing without the use of backtrack-
ing. In order to better understand the results of the comparison, we simulate
the virtual overlay V O using the same Kademlia overlay as for our own ap-
proach but replacing the tree routing by tunnels corresponding to the shortest
paths between overlay neighbors. So, we parametrized the related approaches
by either using the proposed standard parameters or selecting parameters that
are suitable for comparison because they corresponds to the same degree of
redundancy as the parametrization of our own approach.
All results were averaged over 20 runs. They are displayed with 95% confi-
dence intervals. Each run consisted of 100, 000 routing attempts for a randomly
selected source-destination pair.
Expectations: We expect that the routing length decreases with the number
of embeddings, because the number of available routes and thus the probability
to discover the shortest route in one embedding increases. In general, the routing
length is directly related to the tree depth and should thus be lower for BFS
and DIV-DEP.
Similarly, we expect a higher stabilization overhead for trees of a higher depth
as the expected number of descendants per node increases. Thus, the number
of nodes that need to select a new parent should be higher for DIV-RAND than
for DIV-DEP and BFS.
In comparison to the existing approaches, our approach should enable shorter
routes between pairs of nodes than both Freenent and VO. As shown above, we
achieve a routing complexity of O (log n) whereas the related work achieves at
best routes of polylog length. However, our routes for content discovery should
be slightly longer than in VO. VO utilizes the same DHT routing but uses
shortest paths rather than the longer tree routes.
Results: The impact of the three parameters, number of trees, tree construc-
tion, and distance on the routing length confirms our expectations. First, the
results indicate that the tree construction, in particular the number of trees, is
the dominating factor for the routing length. So, the routing length decreased
considerably if multiple embeddings were used because the shortest route in any
of the trees was considered. Second, preferring parents closer to the root, i.e.,
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Figure 4: Impact of number of embeddings γ, tree construction, and distance
function on routing length for a) tree routing and b) Kademlia lookup with
degree of parallelism α; related approaches result in routing lengths of 14 (virtual
overlay V O) and close to 10, 000 (Freenet), and c) stabilization overhead
using BFS or DIV-DEP, produced shorter routes in the tree and hence reduced
the routing length. Third, in comparison to the tree construction, the choice
of a distance function had less impact. For BFS or DIV-DEP, the advantage
of TD over CPL was barely noticeable, whereas the difference for DIV-RAND
was still small but noticeable. In order to understand this difference, note that
CPL is expected to lead to longer routes. The reason for the longer routes lies
in forwarding the request to neighbors at a higher depth, which might have a
long common prefix but are nevertheless at a higher distance from the destina-
tion due to their depth. For BFS or DIV-DEP, the difference of the depth of
neighbors was generally small because neighbors at a lower depth were prefer-
ably selected as parents. In contrast, DIV-DEP allows for larger differences
in depth. Hence there is a higher probability to increase the tree distance by
selecting a neighbor with a longer common prefix length but at a high depth.
All in all, the routing length varied between 4.67 (BFS, γ = 15, TD) and 6.24
(DIV-RAND, γ = 1, CPL) hops, as displayed in Figure 4a. In summary, the
use of multiple embeddings indeed reduced the routing length considerably.
The performance of the DHT lookup in the virtual overlay directly related
to the previous results (cmp. Fig. 4b for the distance under TD). The overhead
for the discovery of a randomly chosen Kademlia ID, stored at the node with
the closest ID in the overlay, varied between 15.56 and 24.25 hops in the F2F
overlay, at around 4 hops in the virtual overlay.
By Theorem 6.4, the stabilization complexity was expected to increase at
most quadratic with the number of trees. Indeed, Figure 4c supports this fact
for DIV-RAND. The increase for BFS and DIV-DEP was even only linear and
slightly super-linear, respectively. Note that the quadratic increase is due to the
raising average depth of additional trees generated by Algorithm 1. With the
goal of achieving diverse spanning trees, nodes select parents at a higher depth.
However, the average number of descendants increases with the depth, because
a node at depth l is a descendant of l nodes. Due to the stabilization complexity
corresponding to the number of the departing node’s descendants, the stabiliza-
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tion overhead was higher for DIV-RAND and DIV-DEP than for BFS. More
precisely, BFS constructs all γ trees independently, so that the average depth
of each tree is independent of the number of trees. The stabilization complexity
per tree thus remains constant. DIV-DEP, aiming to balance diversity and short
routes, causes stabilization overhead between the two former approaches, but
performed closer to BFS (this similarity also held for the routing length). More
concretely, the average stabilization overhead for a departing node was slightly
below 4.5 for a single tree. For γ = 15 it increased to 65 (BFS ), 69 (DIV-DEP),
and more than 101 (DIV-RAND). In contrast to a complete re-computation of
the embedding requiring at least n = 63392 messages, the stabilization overhead
is negligible.
For the related approaches, we found a routing length of 9403.1 for Freenet,
16.11 for VO with α = 1, and 14.07 for VO with α = 3. Furthermore, the
shortest paths are on average of length 4.31, meaning that our routing length of
4.67 is close to optimal. So, routing between nodes in the tree required less than
half the overhead of state-of-the-art approaches. Routing in the virtual overlay,
requiring at best less than 16 hops in our scheme, was slightly more costly in
our approach than in VO due to the inability of the tree routing to guarantee
shortest paths between virtual neighbors.
A straight-forward comparison of the stabilization overhead was not possible.
Since Freenet stabilizes periodically, there is no overhead directly associated with
a leaving node. In case of virtual overlays, VO uses flooding for stabilization,
which is clearly more costly. Other overlays such as X-Vine use less costly
stabilization but stabilization and routing overhead are unstable and increase
over time as shown in [6], so that it is unclear which state of the system should be
considered for a comparison. In order to nevertheless give a lower bound on the
stabilization overhead, we computed the number of tunnels that needed to be
rebuild in VO. On average, 477.35 tunnels corresponding to shortest paths were
affected by a departing node. If a tunnel is repaired by routing in the Kademlia
overlay like in X-Vine, the stabilization overhead per tunnel corresponds to
routing a request and the corresponding reply, i.e., for tunnels corresponding to
shortest paths at least 2 · 14 = 28 messages, resulting in a lower bound on more
than 10, 000 messages per node departure. The above stabilization algorithm is
unable to maintain short routes, such that the actual overhead of stabilization
in virtual overlay is even higher than the above lower bound.
Discussion: Our simulation study validates the asymptotic bounds. Indeed,
the routing length and thus the routing complexity for messaging is very low,
improving on the state-of-the-art by more than a factor of 3. The stabilization
complexity is similarly low if the number of trees is not too high. Even for
γ = 15 trees, the number of involved nodes is generally well below 100, which
still improves upon virtual overlays such as VO, the most promising state-of-
the-art candidate. Only content discovery in form of a DHT lookup was slightly
more costly in our approach than in VO, which we consider acceptable given
the considerable advantage with regard to all other metrics.
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We have considerably improved the efficiency of F2F overlays. In the follow-
ing, we show that we also mitigated their vulnerability to failures and attacks.
7 Robustness and Censorship-Resistance
In this section, we consider the robustness and resilience to censorship of VOUTE.
Note that the evaluation of the censorship-resilience requires a specification of
the modified stabilization algorithm S′, which refer to as attack strategy in the
following. After deriving two attack strategies, we subsequently present our
theoretical and simulation-based evaluation.
We express our results in terms of node coordinates and distances δTD and
δCPL rather than the corresponding diversity measures. The use of distances
simplifies the notation as we do not need to apply a hash cascade for the com-
parison of coordinates and return addresses. As the routing paths are chosen
identical for both coordinates and return addresses, the results are equally valid
for return addresses.
7.1 Attack Strategy
We first describe our attack strategies and then comment on additional strategies
and our reasons on selecting In order to model secure and insecure root selection
protocols, we consider two realizations of ATT-RAND and ATT-ROOT. In the
following, assume that one attacker node has established x links to honest nodes
and now aims to censor communication.
For secure spanning trees, the adversary A is unable to manipulate the root
election. Nevertheless, A can manipulate the subsequent embedding. The attack
strategy ATT-RAND assigns each of its children a different random prefix rather
than the correct prefix. In this manner, routing fails because nodes in the higher
levels of the tree do not recognize the prefix. So, the impact of the attack is
increased in comparison to a random failure.
In contrast, if the adversary A can manipulate the root election protocol,
ATT-ROOT manipulates the root election in all spanning trees such that A
becomes the root in all trees. Under the assumption that the root observes the
maximal number of requests, the attack should result in a high ratio of failed
requests.
Now, we shortly comment on some further attack strategies we choose not to
implement and give reasons for our decision not to do so.
First, note that in the original PIE embedding, assigning the same coordinate
to two children is another attack strategy. In contrast to the above strategy,
the routing can then fail even if the attacker is not involved in forwarding the
actual request because the node coordinates are not unique and thus the request
might end up at a different node than the receiver. In the modified embedding,
the child decides on the last element of the coordinate. Hence, the attacker
can only assign a node w the coordinate of another node v as a prefix, so that
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the two nodes appear to be close but are indeed not. However, upon realizing
that w does not offer a route to v, the routing algorithm backtracks, so that
this attack strategy merely increases the routing complexity but not the success
ratio. Thus, we do not consider it here.
Second, recall from Section 3 that the attacker can also generate an arbi-
trary number of identities whereas the above attack strategies only rely on one
identity. In the following, we argue that without additional knowledge, the use
of additional identities in the tree does not improve the strength of the attack.
ATT-RAND actually simulates different virtual identities by providing fake
distinct prefixes to all children. Indeed, in practice, it might be wise to indeed
use distinct physical nodes because it minimizes the risk of detection if two
neighbors realize that they are connected to the same physical node but received
different prefixes.
For ATT-ROOT, the attacker might have to create (virtual) identities in
order to manipulate the root election. As soon as A is the root in each tree,
multiple identities could be used to provide prefixes of different lengths. How-
ever, if a neighbor u of A receives a long prefix from A, there is a high chance
that u and potential descendants of u choose different parents seemingly closer
to the root. Thus, in expectation a large number of nodes joins those subtrees
rooted at a neighbor of A with a short prefix. As routing within such a subtree
does not require to forward a request from A, A’s impact is likely to be reduced.
Hence, without concrete topology knowledge, the insertion of additional vir-
tual identities (corresponding to prefixes of different lengths) does usually not
present an obvious advantage for A.
7.2 Theoretical Analysis
We present two theoretical results in this section. First, we characterize the
backtracking algorithm more closely. Second, we show that the censorship-
resistance is improved by using the distance δCPL rather than δTD.
Throughout this section, let RTD and RCPL denote Algorithm 2 with dis-
tance δTD and δCPL, respectively. Furthermore, let GR
TD and GRCPL denote
the corresponding standard greedy routing algorithms, which terminate in local
optima with regard to the distance to the destination’s coordinate. Let SuccR
denote the success ratio of a routing algorithm R. We are considering the suc-
cess ratio for one embedding. The overall success ratio is improved as it is the
combined success ratio of all embeddings.
Lemma 7.1. We have that
E
(
SuccR
TD
)
≥ E
(
SuccGR
TD
)
E
(
SuccR
CPL
)
≥ E
(
SuccGR
CDF
). (16)
Furthermore, Algorithm 2 is successful if and only if there exists a greedy path
of responsive nodes according to its distance metric δX .
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Proof. Eq. 16 follows because Algorithm 2 is identical to the standard greedy
algorithm until the latter terminates. Then, Algorithm 2 continues to search
for an alternative, possible increasing the success ratio.
For the second part, recall that a greedy path is a path p = (v0, . . . , vl) such
that the distance to the destination vl decreases in each step, i.e., δ(id(e), id(vi)) <
δ(id(e), id(vi−1)) for all i = 1..l and a distance δ. Assume Algorithm 2 does
not discover a route from the source v0 = s and vl = e despite the exis-
tence of a greedy path p = (v0, v1, . . . , vl−1, vl) of responsive nodes. Let VR
be the set of nodes that forwarded the request according to Algorithm 2, and
let j = max{i : vi ∈ VR}. Then the neighbor of vj+1 did not receive the request
despite being closer to e than vj . Though vj might have a neighbor w closer to
e than vj+1, the request is backtracked to vj if forwarding to w does not result
in a route to the destination. Routing only terminates if either a route is found
or vj has forwarded the request to all closer neighbors, including vj+1. Thus,
Algorithm 2 cannot fail if a greedy path exists. In contrast, if there are not any
greedy paths from s to e, any path p = (v0, v1, . . . , vl−1, vl) with v0 = s and
vl = e contains a pair (vi−1, vi) with δ(id(e), id(vi)) ≥ δ(id(e), id(vi−1)). Thus,
Algorithm 2 does not forward the request to vi and hence does not discover a
path from s to e. It follows that indeed Algorithm 2 is successful if and only if
a greedy path of responsive nodes exists.
Now, we use Lemma 7.1 to show that using a common prefix length based
distance generally enhances the censorship-resistance.
Theorem 7.2. Let A be an attacker applying either ATT-RAND or ATT-
ROOT. Then for all distinct nodes s, e ∈ V
SuccR
CPL
s,e = 0 =⇒ SuccR
TD
s,e = 0, (17)
i.e., if RCPL does not discover a route between s and e, then RTD does not
discover a route. However, the converse does not hold. In particular,
E
(
SuccR
CPL
)
≥ E
(
SuccR
TD
)
. (18)
Proof. We prove the claim by contradiction. Assume that there is pair s, e such
that the algorithm RTD terminates successfully while RCPL does not. Let p =
(v0, v1, . . . , vl) with v0 = s and vl = e denote the discovered route. By Lemma
7.1, p is a greedy path for distance δTD but not for δCPL. In other words, there
exists 0 ≤ i < l such that i) δTD(id(vi+1), id(e)) < δTD(id(vi), id(e)) and ii)
δCPL(id(vi+1), id(e)) ≥ δCPL(id(vi), id(e)). By the definitions of both distances
in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2, this implies that cpl (id(vi+1), id(e)) < cpl (id(vi), id(e))
and |id(vi+1)| < |id(vi)|. In other words, vi+1’s coordinate has a lower common
prefix length to id(e) and is shorter than id(vi). The right side of Figure 5
displays an example.
We base our contradiction upon the following observation concerning routes
in trees. Consider the tree route between two nodes, i.e., the path between
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Figure 5: Illustrating the proof of Theorem 7.2: left: vi+1 is closer to destination
e than vi for distance δTD but not for δCPL; right: pair (s, e) for which R
CPL
is successful as s forwards to u, but RTD is not successful because s forwards
to the attacker.
them using only tree edges. Along the tree route, the common prefix length
stays constant until the least common ancestor is reached and then increases.
Now, if id(vi+1) has a shorter common prefix with id(e) than id(vi), vi+1 is not
contained in the tree route. Furthermore, as the routing algorithm RCPL does
not successfully discover a route, the attacker has to control one node on the
tree route.
We can use the above observation to establish contradictions for both ATT-
RAND and ATT-ROOT. Note that if the common prefix length decreases when
forwarding to vi+1, we need to have cpl (id(vi), id(e)) > 0. For the attack
strategy ATT-RAND, the attacker on the tree route is either an ancestor of
vi or of e. However, the attacker replaces the prefixes of all its children and
hence descendants, so that the perceived common prefix length of vi’ and e’s
coordinates should be 0 unless there exists an attacker-free tree route. This is a
clear contradiction. Similarly, if cpl (id(vi), id(e)) > 0, vi and e have a common
ancestor aside from the root. In particular, the tree route does not pass the
root. When applying ATT-ROOT, the only attacker is the root, which again
contradicts that there is an attacker on the tree route. Thus, we have shown by
contradiction that RTD only succeeds if RCPL does.
Thus, we have shown that indeed Eq. 17 holds. Eq. 18 is a direct conse-
quence as it averages over all source-destination pairs and systems. It remains
to show that the converse of Eq. 17 does not hold. In other words, there exist
instances when RCPL terminates successfully while RTD fails. We display such
an example in Figure 5.
While we can show that our enhancements are indeed enhancements, our
theoretical analysis does not provide any absolute bounds on the success ratio.
In particular, we cannot compare our success ratio to that of virtual overlays.
7.3 Simulations
We utilized the simulation model and set-up from Section 6 for evaluating
the efficiency and extended it to include the methodology for robustness and
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censorship-resistance. So, we simulate the robustness of an overlay by subse-
quently selecting random failed nodes. In each step, we select a certain fraction
of additional failed nodes and then determine the success ratio. Furthermore, we
evaluate attacks using the two attack strategies ATT-RAND and ATT-ROOT
described above. We first establish the overlay applying the respective attack
strategy and then execute the routing for randomly selected source-destination
pairs of responsive nodes.
We compare our results to the virtual overlay VO, described in Section 6.
Our attacker on VO does not manipulate the tunnel establishment but merely
drops requests. Recall that routing in VO relies on a Kademlia DHT such that
neighbors in the DHT communicate via a tunnel of trusted links. The routing
between two DHT neighbors thus fails if the attacker is contained in the tunnel.
However, if routing between two overlay neighbors fails, the startpoint of the
failed tunnel can attempt to select a different overlay neighbor as long as it has
one neighbor closer to the destination. We further enhance the success ratio of
VO by optionally allowing backtracking in the DHT. In addition, we also allow
for shortcuts, i.e., rather than following the tunnel to its endpoint, nodes on the
path can change to a different tunnel with an endpoint closer to the destination.
Thus, we maximize the chance of successful delivery in VO by backtracking and
shortcuts in addition to the use of non-strategic attacker.
Set-up: We used the embedding and routing algorithms as parametrized in
Section 6.
In order to evaluate the robustness, we removed up to 50% of the nodes in
steps of 1%. During the process of removing nodes, individual nodes inevitably
became disconnected from the giant component, so that routing between some
pairs was no longer possible. For this reason, we only considered the results for
source-destination pairs in the same component. Our results are presented for
1, 5, and 15 trees only.
The number of edges x controlled by the adversary A were chosen as x =
2i × dlog2 ne with 0 ≤ i ≤ 6 and dlog2 ne = 16. So, up to 1, 024 attacker edges
were considered. In particular, x = 1024 >
√
n
logn , a common asymptotic bound
on the number of edges to honest nodes considered for Sybil detection schemes
[25]. For quantifying the achieved improvement, we compared our approach to
the resilience of the original PIE embedding and routing, i.e., 1 tree, δTD, and
no backtracking.
For VO, we used a degree of parallelism of α = 1. Since backtracking was
applied, all values of α > 0 resulted in the same success ratio, because regardless
of the value of α, the routing succeeded if and only if a greedy path in the virtual
overlay existed. Thus, restricting our evaluation to α = 1 did not impact our
results with regard to the success ratio.
We averaged the results over 20 runs with 10, 000 source-destination pairs
each. Results are presented with 95% confidence intervals.
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Expectations: We expect that the use of backtracking already increases the
success ratio considerably for γ = 1. However, for large failure ratios or a large
number of attacker edges, the single-connected nature of the tree should result
in a low success ratio. By using multiple trees, we expect to further increase
the success ratio until close to 100% of the paths correspond to a greedy path
and hence a route in at least one embedding.
For the robustness to failures, the original distance function TD should result
in a higher success ratio than CPL because of its shorter routes, as seen in
Section 6.2, and thus lower probability to encounter a random failed node.
However, by Theorem 7.2, CPL increases the success ratio in contrast to the
original distance.
Our first attack strategy, ATT-RAND, should not have a strong impact as
the fraction of controlled edges is low and the attacker usually does not have
an important position in the trees. In contrast, we expect many requests to
be routed via the root, so that at least for a low number of trees, ATT-ROOT
should be an effective attack strategy.
In comparison, our attack on VO does not enable the attacker to obtain
a position of strategic importance, so that the impact of the attack should
be much less drastic than ATT-ROOT. However, communication between DHT
neighbors relies on one tunnel whereas tree embeddings provide multiple routes.
Thus, when using multiple diverse trees, we expect our approach to be similarly
effective as VO, possibly even more effective.
Results: While the results verified our expectations with regard to the ad-
vantage of the distance TD for random failures and of CPL for attacks, the
observed differences between the two distances were negligible, i.e., less than
0.1%. Hence, we present the results for CPL in the following with the exception
of the results for the original PIE embedding.
We start by evaluating the robustness to random failures. The results, dis-
played in Figure 6a, indicate that the use of multiple embeddings considerably
increased the robustness. The success ratio for γ = 1 was low, decreasing in
a linear fashion to less than 30% for a failure ratio of 50%. In contrast, for
γ = 15, the success ratio exceeded 90%. Though the number of embeddings was
the dominating factor, the tree constructing algorithm also strongly influenced
the success ratio. For γ > 1, aiming to choose distinct parents improved the
robustness to failures because of the higher number of distinct routes. For ex-
ample, when routing in 5 parallel embeddings, the success ratio was above 80%
for DIV-RAND. In contrast, BFS had a success ratio below 70%. In summary,
the robustness to failures was extremely high for multiple embeddings, enabling
a success ratio of more than 95% for up to 20% failed nodes. The robustness was
further increased by using DIV-RAND or DIV-DEP rather than BFS, showing
that even such relatively simple schemes can achieve a noticeable improvement.
Now, we consider the censorship-resistance for x = 16 attacking edges, as
displayed in Figure 6b. If the adversary A was unable to manipulate the root se-
lection, the success ratio was only slightly below 100%. Even if γ = 1, more than
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99.5% of the routes were successfully discovered. The high resilience against
ATT-RAND was to be expected, considering that the attack was only slightly
more severe than failure of one random node. If the attacker was able to become
the root in all trees, the success ratio dropped to about 93% for γ = 1. However,
with multiple trees, the ratio of ATT-ROOT was close to 100%. The impact of
the tree construction was small but noticeable. So, BFS generally resulted in
a slightly lower success ratio. Hence, by using multiple embeddings and back-
tracking, the resilience to an adversary that can establish only dlog2 |V |e is such
that nearly all routes are successfully found.
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Figure 6: a) Robustness to failures for distance CPL and b),c) Censorship-
Resistance of tree routing for distance CPL to adversaries which are either able
to undermine the root election (ATT-ROOT ) or are unable to do so (ATT-
RAND) for b) x = 16 attacking edges, and c) up to 1, 024 attacking edges and
tree construction DIV-DEP
For an increased number of attacking edges x, the success ratio remained
close to 100% when more than one tree was used for routing, as displayed
in Figure 6c for DIV-DEP. However, for one tree, the success ratio decreased
drastically if an attacker could undermine the root selection. For x = 1024, i.e.,
if the attacker controlled edges to roughly 1.7% of the nodes, the success ratio
for γ = 1 decreased to slightly less than 30%. In contrast, if γ = 5 or γ = 15,
the success ratio was still 97.9 or 99.9%, respectively.
In order to quantify the improvements provided by our resilience enhance-
ments, we compared the results for our approach with the PIE embedding. As
can be seen from Figure 6a, the success ratio dropped much more quickly for
PIE than for the improved approaches. For an adversary with x = 16 connec-
tions to honest nodes, PIE suffered from more than twice the numbers of failed
requests than the remaining systems (Figure 6c) because it relies on only one
tree and does not apply backtracking. When increasing the number of attacker
edges, the success ratio dropped further to less than 15% for x = 1024. Our
approach achieved more than twice the success ratio even for γ = 1.
In contrast to PIE, VO exhibited a rather high success ratio as displayed in
Figure 6c. VO’s advantage in contrast to γ = 1 holds despite VO’s longer routes
(see Section 6.2). The reason for VO’s lower vulnerability lies in the absence of
strategic manipulation. While greedy embeddings allow the attacker to assume
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an important role, our attacker in VO does not attract a disproportional fraction
of traffic. However, establishing multiple trees ensures that the role of the root
is effectively mitigated, so that the censorship-resilience of VO is slightly lower
than VOUTE’s resilience for 5 or more parallel embeddings.
Discussion: We have shown that multiple embedding and backtracking enable
high resilience, outperforming state-of-the-art approaches. Here, we focused on
node-to-node communication. While content retrieval results in longer routes,
we expect the success ratio to be similar as backtracking in the DHT allows the
use of multiple paths. In addition, the number of replicas per content can be
adjusted to increase the success ratio.
While Theorem 7.2 shows the advantage of CPL in the presence of failures,
the actual advantage is negligible, so that it seems more sensible to use the
original distance TD due to its higher efficiency.
In summary, our enhancements to the robustness and censorship-resistance
were both needed and highly effective.
8 Anonymity and Membership-Concealment
We show that our return addresses provide plausible deniability.
Theorem 8.1. Let u be a local attacker, which is aware only of its direct neigh-
bors Nu in the social graph, and let y = (y1, . . . , yγ) with routing information
k˜ = (k˜1, . . . , k˜γ) be a vector of return addresses generated by Algorithm 3 for the
node uy. Then u cannot identify ey with absolute certainty using a polynomial-
time algorithm A, i.e., P (A(y, k˜) = ey) < 1 for all return address vectors y. So,
we guarantee possible innocence with regard to both sender and receiver ano-
nymity in the absence of identifying side channel information such as timing
analysis.
Proof. We start by considering receiver anonymity. We consider three cases and
show for each case that either i) the attacker can determine that the receiver
is not a neighbor but cannot infer the coordinate of the actual receiver or ii)
the attacker remains uncertain if the receiver is a neighbor or a neighbor’s
descendant. We illustrate the cases in Figure 7. Throughout the proof, let
vi ∈ Nu be the closest neighbor of u to yi for i = 1, . . . , γ.
First, assume there exist i, j such that vi 6= vj . It follows that none of u’s
neighbors is the receiver due to the fact that the receiver can be identified as
the closest node to all return addresses. So, u, not being aware of the remaining
nodes and their coordinates in the system, cannot identify the receiver.
For the second case, assume that indeed vi = vj for all 1 ≤ i, j,≤ γ but
there exists an i such that cpl(hc(id(vi), k˜i), yi) < |id(vi)|, i.e., the common
prefix length of id(vi) and the target coordinate is less than the length of vi’s
coordinate. Then vi cannot be the receiver because at least the last element in
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Figure 7: Illustrating the proof of Theorem 8.1: Let v1 and v2 be the neighbors
with the closest coordinates to the receiver’s coordinates id1(e) and id2(e) in
the first and second embedding, respectively. The attacker can only infer if
neighbors are not the receiver e but can not tell if they are. In particular,
the attacker A knows the common prefix of the receiver’s coordinates and the
coordinates of its neighbors but not the remaining elements of the coordinate,
as indicated by the ?s in the coordinate. In the first scenario, v1 6= v2 shows
that the receiver is not a neighbor. In the second scenario, A can infer that the
third element of the receiver’s coordinate id1(e) is not c and hence v1 is not
the receiver. In the last scenario, A is unable to tell if a neighbor is indeed the
receiver or if a child of the neighbor is the receiver.
the i-th coordinate of vi does not agree with id i(ey). So, again the receiver is
not a neighbor of u and hence u is unable to identify e due to its limited view
of the overlay.
Third, assume that indeed vi = vj for all 1 ≤ i, j,≤ γ and cpl(hc(id(vi), k˜i), yi) =
|id(vi)| for all i. Then, the node vi can potentially be the receiver but so can
any node w that is a descendant of vi in all trees. Any return address vector
of w would result in the same results as a return address vector of vi from u’s
local point of view. Due to its restricted topology knowledge, u is unaware if
such a descendant w exists, and hence can only guess that ey is the receiver but
cannot be certain.
Thus, receiver anonymity follows as the return address does not allow the
unique identification of the receiver. Sender anonymity follows analogously as
a node can always forward a request from a child.
Note that the above proof does not require the application of the hash cas-
cade. However, without the application, an attacker can always infer the com-
mon prefix length of two receiver addresses. If we apply the hash cascade, the
attacker can only determine the distance of receiver addresses to its own coor-
dinates but might be unable to detect how close two addresses actually are. In
this manner, the attacker can only infer very limited topology information. By
hiding the topology of the social graph, we prevent the identification of users
by comparing a pseudonymous topology to an external social graph.
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9 Conclusion
We have introduced a privacy-preserving, efficient, and resilient design for F2F
overlays. For this purpose, we have developed an algorithm for the generation
of anonymous return addresses Furthermore, we have designed multiple parallel
network embeddings to enable both efficiency and resilience, as validated by an
extensive simulation study.
Extending our simulation results, we are currently integrating our algorithms
in an existing F2F overlay and have started initial testbed studies to better
understand the system and its performance in real environments.
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Appendix
In this section, we show how to obfuscate return addresses in VOUTE further.
PPP addresses are then generated by adding an additional layer of symmetric
encryption to RAP return addresses generated by Algorithm 3. The idea of the
approach is to allow u to determine if the common prefix length of a coordinate
is longer than cpl(cord(y), id(u)) but not the actual length. For this reason, the
additional layer can only be applied when using the common prefix length as
a distance. In a nutshell, we generate PPP return address through symmetri-
cally encryption of a RAP return address using key material only known within
certain subtrees.
Let Enc : H × KSym → H be a semantically secure symmetric encryption
function onto h’s image H with keyspace KSym. Dec : H × Sym → H de-
notes the corresponding decryption. For each subtree of the spanning tree, we
distribute keys. To achieve that, each internal node w at level l generates a
symmetric key kl(w) by a pseudo-random key generation algorithm SymGen.
Subsequently, w distributes kl(w) to all its descendants. In this manner, a node
v at level l˜ obtains keys k1(v), . . . , kl˜−1(v) such that kλ(v) was generated by v’s
ancestor at level λ and forwarded to v along the tree edges. So, kλ(v) is known
to all nodes having a common prefix length of at least λ with v. After generat-
ing a RAP return address y = (d1, . . . , dL), v additionally encrypts the λ+ 1-th
element with the key kλ(v), constructing the return address y
′ = (d′1, . . . , d
′
L)
with
d′j =
{
Enc(kj−1(v), dj), 2 ≤ j ≤ l
dj , otherwise
. (19)
The second case in Eq. 19 treats the first element, which remains unencrypted,
and the randomly chosen padding, which does not agree with any coordinate.
After generating y′, v publishes y′, the routing information k˜ for generating
y and mac(KMAC(v), y′). The pseudo code of the additional encryption is
displayed in Algorithm 4.
A third realization RPPP of the routing algorithm Rnode is given by the
construction of PPP addresses. During routing, a node u at level l first applies
the decryption function to the second to l + 1-th element of the return address
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y′ = (d′1, . . . , d
′
L). So, v obtains f(y
′) = (z1, . . . , zl+1) with
zj =
{
d′1, j = 1
Dec(kj−1(u), d′j), otherwise
.
Afterwards, u determines cpl(f(y′), cash(k˜, c)) for all coordinates c in its neigh-
borhood. Note that cpl(f(y′), cash(k˜, c) is only a lower bound on cpl(cord(y), c) =
cpl(y, cash(k˜, c) because u is not able to correctly decrypt some elements of y′.
Based on the common prefix length, v can evaluate the diversity measure
δuPPP−CPL(y
′, k˜, c) = δCPL(f(y′), cash(c, k˜)) (20)
for the distance δCPL defined in Eq. 2. In this manner, the node u obtains a
set of all neighbors closer to the destination than itself. So, u chooses a random
node from this set as the next hop.
We here give a short intuition on why Algorithm 4 indeed generates PPP
anonymous return addresses. A formal proof is sketched in Section ??. Let u be
a arbitrary node and y′ be a return address generated by v, a node at level lv. If
cpl(id(v), id(u)) = λ, u correctly decrypts the first λ+ 1 elements of y′ because
ki(u) = ki(v) for i = 1 . . . λ. Due to the semantic security of the symmetric
encryption, u cannot infer information about the remaining elements of y from
d′λ+2, . . . , d
′
lu
because u does not know ki(v) for i > λ+ 1. Thus, y
′ indeed only
reveals if a coordinate c shares a longer common prefix with cord(y) than id(v).
Algorithm 4 addPPPLayer()
{Input: RAP return address y = (d1, . . . , dL)}
{Internal State: Keys k1(v), . . . , kl−1(v), EncSym}
1: for i = 2 . . . l do
2: dj ← EncSym(kj−1(v), dj) {Encrypt element j}
3: end for
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